




A

LETTER

ON THE

INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY,

TO

THE HON. WILLIAM McDOUGAL, C. B.,

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS.

BY

J. W. LAWRENCE.

SAINT JOHN, N. B.

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P R E F A C E .

NO QUESTION will come before the Canadian Parliament of as great importance to the country, as the one as to the best route for the INTER-COLONIAL RAILWAY.

Its wrong location would be of lasting injury, which no subsequent legislation could entirely remedy. An error in almost any other matter could be amended, or repealed whenever expedient. Not so the location of this great Work.

The Secretary of the Quebec Board of Trade most justly remarked, "That on the judicious selection of the route for the Intercolonial road will perhaps depend our prosperity and contentment."

The Montreal *Trade Review* observes: "The importance of the subject cannot well be over-estimated; and as all Canadians from the remotest West to the farthest East, are more or less directly interested, they should lose no opportunity to make themselves acquainted with the true merits of a question, which before the end of the present year, must come up for practical settlement, and the wise deciding of which is a matter of such vital importance."

The attention of the Members of Parliament is most respectfully asked to the Letter addressed to "The Minister of Public Works," on the route best calculated "to serve evenly the interests of all four of the Provinces of the Dominion," and which at the same time should be unexceptionable to the British Government.

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THE
INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY.

TO HON. WILLIAM McDougall, C. B.,

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS IN CANADA.

SIR,—

The many and great interests involved in the right location of the Intercolonial Railway, is the only apology I can offer for addressing you on the subject.

The Act of Union declares, "That inasmuch as the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, have joined in a declaration that the construction of the Intercolonial Railway is essential to their CONSOLIDATION, it shall be the duty of the Government and Parliament of Canada to provide for its commencement within six months after the Union."

The importance of connecting the western Provinces with the Atlantic Ocean has for a long time occupied public attention. The pioneer in the movement was the late John Wilson, Esquire, of Chamcook, County of Charlotte. It was chiefly through his exertions that an Act of Incorporation was obtained, in 1836, from the New Brunswick Legislature for the construction of a Railway from St. Andrews to the city of Quebec. This was the first Railway Charter granted by any Colonial Parliament.

A survey was made by Col. Yule, R. E. Forty thousand dollars was given by Sir Archibald Campbell, Governor of New Brunswick, out of the King's Casual and Territorial Revenue. A short and practical route was found. In consequence of the country through which the survey was made being in dispute, the work was not proceeded with.

By the Treaty of 1783, the North Eastern Boundary of the

United States was defined. As the character of the country at that time was but little known, the terms of the treaty were ambiguous. Not long after, it was explored, when *two chains* of highlands were found, between the Atlantic and the St. Lawrence. The question arose, to which of the *two* did the treaty refer? The Americans claimed the chain between the St. Lawrence and the St. John: the British, the one between the St. John and the Atlantic. The extent of the territory in dispute was 12,000 square miles.

By the Ashburton treaty, the boundary was settled on the basis of a compromise, New Brunswick receiving the smallest share.

Lord Macaulay opposed the ratification of the treaty in the House of Commons, declaring "there was ceded not only that which we had a right to keep, but which it would in many respects have been advantageous to us to have retained."

The Hon. Mr. Rives, United States Senator, and chairman of Foreign Affairs, also opposed the treaty, on the ground of injustice being done to Great Britain, as she was entitled to *all she claimed*.

One of the proofs brought forward in the American Senate by Mr. Rives, against the Ashburton Treaty, was the following letter from Jared Sparks, the historian, addressed to him:

"While examining among the papers relating to the American Revolution, in the public Archives of Paris, I found in one of the bound volumes an original letter from Dr. Franklin to the Count de Verges, as follows:

PASSEY, *December 6th*, 1782.

SIR,—I have the honor of returning the map your Excellency sent me yesterday. I have marked with A STRONG RED LINE, as requested, the limits of the United States as settled by the British and American Commissioners.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.

This letter was written six days after the preliminaries were signed, and if we could procure the identical map it would afford conclusive evidence as to the boundary. You may well suppose I lost no time in making enquiry for the map, not doubting but it would confirm all my previous opinions respecting the validity of our claims. After a little research in the American division, with the aid of the keeper, I came upon a map *eighteen inches square*, on which was drawn A STRONG RED

LINE throughout the entire boundary of the United States, answering *precisely* to Franklin's description. Imagine my surprise on discovering that this runs wholly south of the St. John, and between the head waters of that river and those of the Penobscot and Kenebec. In short, it is *exactly the line now contended for by Great Britain*, except that it concedes more than is now claimed.

The North line, after departing from the source of the Saint Croix, instead of proceeding to MARS HILL, stops far short of that point, and turns to the West, so as to leave on the British side all the streams which flow into the Saint John.

There is no positive proof that this is the map referred to by Franklin, yet upon any other supposition it would be difficult to explain its agreeing so perfectly with its description, and of being preserved in the place where it would naturally be deposited by Count de Verges.

(Signed) JARED SPARKS."

By that treaty not only has New Brunswick lost a most valuable tract of country, but the Intercolonial Railway from the city of Quebec to the Ocean, will be materially lengthened. The shortest route now practicable between that city and St. John, is 411 miles: if New Brunswick had received her own, 284 would have been the mileage to the Bay of Fundy.

In view of the above, the Imperial Guarantee should cover the whole cost of the Railway, in place of being limited to \$15,000,000. The selection of route also should be left with those who have to keep up and pay for the road.

In 1838, Transatlantic Steam Navigation was established, and Lord Durham urged on the Imperial Government the construction of a Railway from Halifax to Quebec.

In 1843, a survey was ordered for a military Road. It was conducted by Sir James Alexander; and when nearly finished, it was abandoned by the British Government in favor of a Railway.

In 1846, by order of the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Gladstone, a survey was made for a Railway under Major Robinson and Captain Henderson, of the Royal Engineers. It was carried on at the joint expense of the three Colonies and the Mother Country. In 1849, their report was laid before Parliament, and so favorably entertained, that the Colonial Secretary

wrote the Governor General of Canada that Parliament would be asked to give a guarantee on the sum required to build the road. The movement fell through at that time from a change of Ministers.

From a variety of causes, notwithstanding repeated delegations, it was not until 1867 (twenty-one years after Mr. Gladstone's order for the railway survey was made,) that the subject was brought before the Imperial Parliament, and the guarantee secured.

CAN A ROUTE FOR THE INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY BE FOUND, TO MEET THE VIEWS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND AT THE SAME TIME THE COMMERCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DOMINION?

Major Robinson's designation of routes were Northern, Central, and Western. Mr. Fleming does not use the term Western, but Frontier: his No. 3 Frontier, and Nos. 4 and 5 Central, pass through Fredericton and on to the harbor of St. John from the western side.

In referring to the different lines, those which enter St. John from the western side will be called Western lines; and those which intersect the line of railway from St. John to Shediac, Central ones. Mr. Fleming's classification of numbers will be retained.

Before designating the route which appears best calculated "to serve evenly the interests of all four of the Provinces of the Dominion," and at the same time should be unexceptionable to the Imperial Government, some of the objections to the Northern and other routes will be stated.

THE NORTHERN ROUTE.

The Bay Chaleur route, for *two hundred miles* in New Brunswick, would pass through the Counties of Kent, Northumberland, Gloucester, and Restigouche, with a population less than the city of Quebec. And for *one hundred and fifty miles* through Bonaventure and Ramouski, whose population, like that of Gaspé and the above counties in New Brunswick, dwell on the rivers and coasts. By this route, Gaspé at its nearest point would be fifty miles from the railway.

Reference to the map will show that steamers would do

more for these counties than the railway, as better connecting their ports with the Western section of the Dominion.

A railway of 350 miles in length, through a widely scattered population of 90,000, would fall very far short of meeting its running expenses.

So limited is the trade of the four North Shore counties of New Brunswick, through which the Northern lines would pass, that notwithstanding an expenditure of over \$4,000,000 on the construction of a railway connecting the Gulf with the city of St. John, they are unable to sustain a steamer between it and their ports for the seven months they are open, without a Government subsidy, while the traffic on the river St. John maintains a fleet of magnificent boats.

The Grand Trunk Railway Company know well, the injurious results of constructing railways through thinly populated sections of a country. The line from Quebec to River du Loup has entailed on it an annual loss of nearly one quarter of a million of dollars. The Hon. John Rose, when President of the Company, in a memorial to the Government of Canada, stated, "The Eastern section of the road was a dead weight, involving an expenditure *not only crippling, but ruinous.*"

The Nova Scotia and New Brunswick railways, passing through a settled country, have averaged less than three quarters of one per cent. on their cost. This, however, is chiefly from their isolated and detached position. When linked together and extended, their paying properties will be materially improved.

The proximity of the Northern routes to the Bay Chaleur and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, would expose them to the winds and storms, carrying with them clouds of sleet and snow, rendering travelling not only tedious and uncertain, but often causing its entire suspension.

Sanford Fleming, Esquire, C. E., in his report on the Intercolonial Railway, says, "Snow-drifts, where they happen to occur, are serious obstacles to railway operations; they are found to be the cause of frequent interruptions to the regular running of trains, besides often the necessity of a heavy out-

lay. Every winter, in Lower Canada, the trains are delayed for days at a time on account of the *drifts*; the mails are in consequence stopped, and traffic is seriously interfered with."

The railway from Shediac to Saint John, which passes through an open and settled country, has never met with such interruptions.

In 1848, Major Robinson recommended the Northern route on Military grounds. Since then, from the revolution in *Naval Armament*, its claim has entirely disappeared. Then it would have been comparatively safe from attack from the water; now, from gunboats, steam frigates, and armor plated ships, for seven months of the year it would be exposed to the enemy.

Treaties and Orders in Council, since then, have thrown open the waters of the Gulf and Bay to the world.

There are no grounds for alarm from our American neighbors. Their commercial and other interests are so much in common with our's, and like our's all on the side of peace, that should any disturbing element arise, it will be disposed of in the future as in the past, by the *pen* and not the *sword*.

One thing is certain, should the time ever come when the American Government wished to intercept communication by destroying a portion of the Intercolonial, distance will not defeat their purpose.

Better then accept the situation at once, and build the line on a *commercial basis*, knowing that as a military work, should war occur, it would be in danger wherever placed. If constructed as a military road, it would invite attack; while, as a commercial enterprise, its peaceful mission would be its shield.

A COMPROMISE PROPOSITION.

The proposition has been suggested to adopt the *Bay Chaleur and Apchaqui* route, as a compromise between Major Robinson's Bay Chaleur and a Western route. The extent of the sacrifice involved by so doing, will at once be apparent from the following figures:

FROM RIVER DU LOUP TO HALIFAX

By Major Robinson's North Shore route, 560 miles.

" Western No. 3	"	537	"
" Western No. 5	"	594	"
" <i>Bay Chaleur and Apohaqui</i>	"	616	"

FROM RIVER DU LOUP TO ST. JOHN

By Western No. 3 route, 301 miles.

" Western No. 5	"	328	"
" <i>Bay Chaleur and Apohaqui</i>	"	424	"
" Major Robinson's North Shore	"	486	"

Difference from 123 to 158 miles in favor of a Western route.

The following, from Mr. Fleming's report, will show the important lesson taught by these figures: "As the cost of freight would to a large extent depend on the length of the railway to be passed over, it would be of considerable importance to have the shortest and most favourable line selected to the best and nearest port on the Bay of Fundy."

If Commerce is King, the requirements of commerce must be met. The Bay Chaleur and Apohaqui route increases the distance from the St. Lawrence to the harbor of St. John nearly 100 miles over No. 5, while the two other Northern routes nearly 160 miles each. The freight alone on 1,000,000 of barrels, or its equivalent, for the shorter distance of 100 miles, at 15 cents per barrel, would involve an additional cost of \$150,000,—a sum equal to the sinking fund of one per cent. on the \$15,000,000.

As the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario have to pay *eleven-thirteenths* of the cost of the Intercolonial Railway, and have never made its construction a condition of Union, as New Brunswick and Nova Scotia have done, as set forth in the 145th section of the Act of Union, it is only right that the route to be chosen, be one which will secure to *their commerce* a short highway to the best port on the Bay of Fundy, by the shortest and most favorable line. This all-important consideration should never be sacrificed for any sectional interest.

Compromises, as a rule, are failures, and in the location of the Intercolonial Railway, none should be made. If any-

thing further is required to sustain this position, it should be found in the following tables:

MILEAGE TO CONSTRUCT FROM RIVER DU LOUP TO HALIFAX.

By Western No. 3	route, 410 miles.
" Western No. 5	" 437 "
" Bay Chaleur and Apohaqui	" 496 "
" Major Robinson's North Shore	" 499 "

Nor should it be forgotten that the adoption of a Northern or Apohaqui route, would involve the use of a part of the railway from St. John to Shediac—now the property of the General Government—as a *branch line*, not only thereby materially increasing the *permanent way to be upheld*, but also the *mileage to run*, as follows:

FROM RIVER DU LOUP TO ST. JOHN AND HALIFAX.

By Western No. 3	route, 567 miles.
" Western No. 5	" 594 "
" Bay Chaleur and Apohaqui	" 653 "
" Major Robinson's North Shore	" 656 "

By a Western route, the railway from St. John to Shediac would form a section of the Intercolonial.

The following, from a work on Rail Roads, by William M. Gillespie, Esquire, Professor of Civil Engineering, should, in the locating of a railway, be kept prominently in view:

"From the great cost of the superstructure of a railway, and the continually increasing expense of keeping it in repair, it is highly desirable that it should be *as straight*, and consequently *as short* as possible. As the earthwork of a railroad costs almost nothing for repairs, while the expenses of maintenance of its perishable superstructure is very great, and proportional to its *length*, as is also the cost in fuel, wages, and wear and tear of the engines, and running of the road, it will often be advantageous to make large expenditures in order to lessen *the length of the road*."

If the British Government should require the construction of the railway by a Northern route, as a condition of the guarantee, it would be to the interest of Commerce to build the road by a Western route without the guarantee.

No diversity of opinion, however, need be apprehended,

for Scylla and Charybdis can both be avoided, as a route can be found which, while unexceptionable to the British Government, will suit the general interests of the Dominion.

Earl Grey wrote the Hon. Joseph Howe in 1851, "You will observe that I have stated the line is to pass through British territory, but Her Majesty's Government do not necessarily require that it be the one recommended by Major Robinson. If the opinion which is entertained by many persons well qualified to form a judgment is correct, that *a shorter and better line may be found through New Brunswick, it will of course be preferred.*"

CAN A SHORTER AND BETTER LINE BE FOUND THROUGH NEW BRUNSWICK?

The Hon. E. B. Chandler, a delegate to England in 1852, wrote, "We pressed on Earl Derby the route by the City of St. John and its Valley, as it was admitted by all to be the best, and only profitable one in a commercial point of view; and as the whole cost of its construction was to be borne by the three Colonies, it could not be expected that any other line, with a view to Imperial objects, would ever be sanctioned by the Colonial Legislatures."

The Hon. Francis Hincks, who was a delegate from Canada at the same time, expressed his views on the question of routes as follows:

"The North Shore line was distant from the more populous settlements of New Brunswick and from her principal cities of *St. John and Fredericton*, and would pass through a thinly settled country to the St. Lawrence. In a commercial point of view the two lines do not admit of comparison, while the section of line between River du Loup and Quebec would be less than thirty miles distant from the American frontier, *and would be nearly if not quite as much exposed to the enemy as that passing by the Valley of the St. John.*"

The Hon. John A. McDonald, now Premier of Canada, and the Hon. John Rose, then President of the Grand Trunk Railway, wrote the Colonial Secretary in 1858, "That the North Shore route was considered by the Colonies and especially by New Brunswick as being comparatively of little

value, except in a military point of view. *It was long and circuitous*; it would pass through a country but little settled, and could not be expected to make any returns on the cost of construction for years. The line by the city of St. John and its Valley promises great commercial advantages and a fair pecuniary return, and it is understood in Canada that competent military men do not now consider it objectionable as a military road; *nay there are strong reasons for its selection as such, at all events there is no difficulty in finding a line combining the requisites of a military and commercial one."*

ONTARIO AND QUEBEC AND A WESTERN ROUTE.

The St. Lawrence is the natural outlet for the products of the West, yet notwithstanding an expenditure of \$15,000,000 on its unrivalled canals, it has attracted but a small portion of its trade.

The chief rival of Montreal and Quebec for the trade of the West is New York, and although laboring under many disadvantages, she has, from her *low freights*, been enabled to monopolize nearly the whole.

The question arises, can the Intercolonial Railroad secure to the St. Lawrence an increased share of the commerce of the West?

From Lakes Superior and Michigan, the Western products for Montreal and Quebec pass through the Welland Canal; those for New York through the Erie or Welland and Oswego.

The Montreal route saves the transshipment from propellers at Buffalo and Oswego; it also uses large vessels the whole of the voyage, as well as propellers—instead of 350 miles of horse power—on the canals, to which is to be added the saving of towing down the Hudson to New York.

The St. Lawrence route has another advantage over New York. It takes two days to tranship the cargo at Buffalo, and a voyage of twelve days between that port and New York, against three days to Montreal, four to Quebec and five to River du Loup.

A cargo can be delivered at the latter place by propeller for 60 cents per ton over the cost to Montreal, and for \$3 50

additional by the *short route* of the Intercolonial to St. John. The Intercolonial can alone extend the commerce of the St. Lawrence, by following a short route to the ocean. *Lengthened mileage* will as effectually injure it by turning the commerce of the West to the American railways, as the *high freights* of the St. Lawrence have diverted the largest share of it to New York.

This is a point of deep importance to Quebec and Ontario, not only on commercial but on economic grounds, for should a railway cost \$17,000,000, nearly \$15,000,000 of it will have to be paid by those sections of the Dominion.

ST. JOHN THE ATLANTIC PORT FOR ONTARIO AND QUEBEC.

The river St. John, although 400 miles in length, is spanned at its mouth by a suspension bridge 600 feet long, without interrupting navigation.

The city of St. John, at its mouth, has one of the finest harbors in America, and open at all seasons. It is the centre of a large and growing commerce with the Mother Country, the British and foreign West India Islands, the United States, and the British Colonies. It has a population of 50,000, and is distant from River du Loup 300 miles. From its unrivalled position and advantages it should be the Atlantic port for the commerce of the St. Lawrence.

As a ship-building port it has no superior. The reputation of her vessels is not surpassed. In proportion to population, New Brunswick is the largest ship-building country in the world.

The facilities at St. John for repairing vessels are unequalled. At the present time there are five American ships of over 1000 tons each on the blocks, and when finished they will be nearly rebuilt. This is a new branch of industry, and there is no limit to the extent to which it can be prosecuted. The tidal phenomena of the harbor of St. John are such, that it is one of the finest natural docks in the world.

The trade of New Brunswick with foreign West India Islands is fast increasing. In 1863 there were shipped to Cuba only 34,136 box shooks; in 1865, 433,363; while from St. John alone from Sept. 1st, 1866, to 30th April, 1867—

a period of seven months—749,620 were shipped. Formerly Cuba was entirely supplied from Maine; now the New Brunswick shooks are preferred. In 1864, New Brunswick shipped to Cuba and Porto Rico 4,669,658 feet of lumber: in seven months, ending 30th April, 1867, Saint John shipped 6,415,906 feet.

This trade offers superior facilities for return cargoes, as the vessels leave St. John and return during the close of the St. Lawrence, so that the merchants of Quebec and Ontario could receive their supplies over the Intercolonial, weeks in advance of the opening of navigation.

The extent and value of the trade of the West India Islands, which has been chiefly enjoyed by the United States, is very large. In 1864 their imports were \$255,038,000, of which only \$3,727,860 was from the British Provinces.

The Commissioners appointed to enquire into the trade of these Islands, justly remarked, "that the trade of British America with countries so commercially active, and having a population of 15,000,000, whose products are so different from ours, and yet as necessary to us as ours to them, ought to be increased."

The unsurpassed facilities which St. John enjoys from her great command of tonnage, low port charges, storage, wharfage, and labor, should secure for her a large share of the carrying trade between Canada and these Islands. For the shipment of grain her lumber-carrying vessels are admirably adapted, saving the whole expense of building inside "skin and bulk heads," as they are not required.

A line of Steamers are now running between St. John and Glasgow, with frequent arrivals of others from Liverpool and London. The Montreal Steamships occasionally call at St. John in the winter months.

The certainty of at all times finding cargoes, enables vessels to deliver freight at St. John at lower rates than at any other Atlantic port.

In a late number of the *Trade Review*, is the following:—
"The time cannot be far distant when some branches of our manufactures will be seeking still further expansion, and

looking for fresh markets in other parts of the world. With two such ports as St. John and Halifax, connected by railway with rich and populous interiors, many an enterprise will become not only possible but probable; and with these ports as a base of operations, we may be enabled to compete with America."

The great advantages possessed by St. John for an Atlantic port for the commerce of Quebec and Ontario, *can be largely neutralized, if not entirely destroyed, by a wrong location of the Intercolonial Railway.*

ST. JOHN AS A DISTRIBUTING POINT.

The map shows St. John to be the natural distributing point for a large district of country. Her position as such is unrivalled. The population dwelling on the rivers and in the interior, as well as on the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia sides of the Bay, together with a large section of the State of Maine, draw their supplies from her.

The railway charges from Montreal to Portland, and from River du Loup to St. John would be the same, the distance by the short route of the Intercolonial being equal.

As the freight by propellers to River du Loup is six cents additional per barrel ~~on~~ delivery at Montreal, while the freight by steamers from Portland to St. John is from 20 to 25 cents, there is a gain of from 14 to 19 cents per barrel, in addition to the saving of one handling and insurance, by the Intercolonial *short route* to St. John.

Produce could be sent from Levis by railway to St. John at less cost than from Montreal via Portland.

All of Canada to the westward of River du Loup is interested in the adoption of this line, as their extensive and extending commerce requires, at all seasons of the year, the most direct route to and from the Ocean. Commercial men, to secure the shortest possible road, would consider it economy to spend, were it necessary in its construction, a larger sum than would be required to build a longer and circuitous one, knowing that the saving in time, freight, fares, running expenses, and maintenance, would far more than compensate for the extra cost.

NOVA SCOTIA AND A WESTERN ROUTE.

The important section of Nova Scotia on the Bay of Fundy embracing the large and flourishing counties of Queen's, Shelburne, Yarmouth, Digby, Annapolis, King's and Hants, with a population of 120,000, and with 207,776 tons of shipping of the value of \$7,500,000, is interested in the most direct route to the Western section of the Dominion.

With a line of steamers crossing the Bay in less than three hours, these fine counties would connect with the railway at St. John. By this route, Annapolis—the ancient capital of Nova Scotia—would be 470 miles distant from the city of Quebec; by the Northern route, 770 miles.

An examination of the map will remove all doubt as to what route will be most to the interest of Nova Scotia, and especially to its Western section.

Even the Eastern portion of that Province would be as much benefited from the Western route, as from either the Central or Northern, for whichever is chosen, the mileage and location in Cumberland and Colechester will be the same.

Halifax—the military and naval head quarters—should prefer the Western route, as it would pass through or connect with *all the military centres* of the Dominion. It would connect in one chain the military and political capitals of Toronto, Quebec, Fredericton, and Halifax, as well as the commercial centres of St. John and Montreal. Its people are too PATRIOTIC to sacrifice such an important *strategical* point for any consideration, or to tax the two Western Provinces with *additional mileage*, for any advantage they might derive from the selection of a Central or Northern route.

The position of Halifax will ever command the passenger travel to and from Europe, with a choice of routes, either to go round the head of the Bay, or to Windsor, and down the Annapolis Valley Railway, and cross the Bay and up the Valley of the St. John, through Fredericton, and on to the West.

In 1852, Sir Francis Hincks, the Colonial Secretary, wrote, "The result of the negotiations which have lately taken place between the Governments of *Canada, Nova Scotia, and*

New Brunswick, and on which legislation has been based, has been the adoption of a different line from that recommended by Major Robinson, which was carried away from the more populous settlements of New Brunswick, and from her principal cities, St. John and Fredericton, through an unsettled country to the St. Lawrence. The proposed line is to pass by the city of St. John, the commercial capital of New Brunswick, and thence by the Valley of the river St. John to the St. Lawrence."

The spirit displayed in 1852 by the Government and Legislature of Nova Scotia, by the adoption of a Western route for the Intercolonial Railway, will doubtless manifest itself in 1867, as such a line is most in harmony with the general interests of the Dominion; and while decidedly the most desirable for the Western section of Nova Scotia, it does not in any way interfere with the interests of the Eastern counties of that Province.

NEW BRUNSWICK AND A WESTERN ROUTE.

By the adoption of No. 5 Western route, the Intercolonial Railway would pass through St. John and Fredericton, the commercial, political, and military capitals of New Brunswick. After leaving Fredericton and ascending the Keswick, this line passes close to the three new and flourishing townships of Knowlesville, Glassville, and Gordonsville, in the County of Carleton.

The counties of Charlotte and Carleton, with the western sections of York and Sunbury, would through the St. Andrews and Woodstock line, and the European and North American Railway, be also brought into connexion with the Intercolonial.

A branch line of less than 25 miles in length, connecting with No. 5—which passes through Fredericton and direct to St. John—would form a connexion with the St. Andrews Railway at Woodstock, bringing that town as close to the Intercolonial as the Shiretown of the county of Kent is to the Major Robinson or any other of the Northern lines.

No. 5 would pass through the western section of Restigouche, as well as cross the Restigouche River. A fine sec-

tion of country for settlement would thus be opened up, which would not be by either a Frontier or Northern route.

Mr. Fleming says, "Between Fredericton and the river Restigouche there is an area of possibly not less than 2,000,000 of acres. Comparing this extensive tract of land with the soil of Upper Canada, it is generally better than any of the unsettled districts in that part of the country."

It would also pass through the heart of Victoria County—one of the finest fields for lumbering in New Brunswick, and at the same time would be within a few hours drive of its Shiretown with its continuous line of settlements on the river.

The construction of a branch from the river St. John through Victoria County to No. 5, would be of early accomplishment, as it would be a work in which the North Eastern section of Maine would be deeply interested.

One of the Great Roads starts from the river St. John at the Grand Falls, crossing the Tobique and on to Dalhousie, the Shiretown of the county of Restigouche.

All the supplies for lumbering operations on the Upper St. John and its tributaries in New Brunswick and the State of Maine, would be carried over this road, until a branch line was built from the river to the Intercolonial. A line by No. 5 would as effectually secure the traffic of that section of country as a Frontier one would, and the interests of Victoria County—as the map will show—would be better secured than by any other route; while the paying properties of the road would not suffer from a rivalry with the river, as it would from the construction of a Frontier line.

A railway from the Shiretown of Northumberland, connecting with the Intercolonial by route No. 5, would be of more benefit to that section of New Brunswick than one by any of the Northern routes. It would give better facilities for lumbering operations, as well as open up a more extensive district of country for settlement. It would make a more direct connexion with Quebec and Ontario, as well as with Western New Brunswick.

The distance from Newcastle, on the Miramichi River, to River du Loup by the Bay Chaleur route, is 310 miles: by

a line connecting with No. 5 route, it would be *reduced to 260 miles.*

THE MIRAMICHI RAILWAY.

A railway from the Northern section of New Brunswick would be an important tributary to the Intercolonial. For that, as well as for other reasons, it is desirable it should be built. The General Government *cannot contribute* to its construction, yet it can most *materially aid* the undertaking.

Of the 328 miles to build by route No 5 from River du Loup to St. John, $44\frac{1}{2}$ are under construction by the European and North American Railway Company, on which the Government of New Brunswick give a bonus of \$10,000 per mile. From Fredericton to the point of intersection, a distance of $21\frac{1}{2}$ miles, the same bonus is available, making for the 66 miles from that city to St. John, \$660,000.

As the Intercolonial from the St. Lawrence to Halifax must be subject to the control of the Government, the sections referred to would require to become the property of the Dominion.

The Stockholders of the E. & N. A. Railway would not likely have any objection to sell the $44\frac{1}{2}$ miles now under construction from St. John. Should any difficulty arise on that point, an arrangement might be made for widening the road-bed and laying a double track. A saving could thereby be made equal to the bonus.

As the Government would pay for the road out of the Intercolonial construction fund, the bonus on the $44\frac{1}{2}$ miles, of \$445,000, might be applied to aid in the building of the Miramichi line.

As yet nothing has been done towards building the $22\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Fredericton; consequently, if constructed as a portion of the Intercolonial, the bonuses could be applied in the same way.

The purchase of the section of the E. & N. A. Railway would relieve the Government of New Brunswick of taking stock to over \$150,000. This might be invested in the Northern line, securing to it in all a cash capital of \$810,000.

The General Government, therefore, by the selection of

route No. 5, can *materially aid* in the construction of the Miramichi line, *without contributing* to the work.

Should the Intercolonial be built by an Apohaqui route, this bonus would not be available.

The St. Stephen's Railway, with a five feet six inch gauge, was built and equipped for less than \$20,000 per mile.

If the 44½ miles should be purchased for a section of the Intercolonial, the E. & N. A. Railway Company would require to run their trains over it to their terminus at St. John. This privilege would yield a material item of revenue to the Intercolonial.

THE DOMINION AND NO. 5 ROUTE.

Mr. Fleming, in his report, says, "As the cost of freight would, to a great extent, depend on the *length of railway to be passed over*, it would be of considerable importance to have the *shortest and most favorable line selected to the best and nearest port on the Bay of Fundy.*"

ST. LAWRENCE TO ST. JOHN BY WESTERN ROUTES.

No. 1 Route, 338 miles.

" 2 " 350 "

" 3 " 320 "

" 4 " 326 "

" 5 " 328 "

The lines Nos. 1 and 3 would, by the Temiscouta Lake, be 19 miles shorter, but Mr. Buck, C. E., in a report of February, 1862, to the Managers of the St. Andrews Railway, wrote, "Mr. Rubridge, the Engineer in charge of the Canadian survey, terminated his explorations, having pronounced the former proposed route to the *Westward of the Temiscouta Lake, on instrumental examination, to be entirely impracticable.*" Mr. B. adds, "A view of the country was sufficient to impress me with the impracticability of extending a road on that side of the mountain, through such a mountainous region: when I say impracticable, I mean by it a most unjustifiable expenditure in construction."

Mr. Rubridge, in his report, writes, "South of the summit of the Degel  the country is crossed and intersected in every

direction by rocky ridges or bold rugged hills, which in some instances attain an elevation of 1800 feet above the sea. The general elevation of the ground at the base of these hills varies from 670 to 900 feet above the sea. Owing to the broken character of the country, it is supposed that a large proportion of the line will be curved, and that in extreme cases curves of half a mile radius will be required, and long maximum gradients estimated at fifty feet per mile will be of frequent occurrence." This refers to Nos. 1 and 3 routes.

In reference to route No. 2, Mr. Fleming says, "It is anticipated that serious, although perhaps not insuperable, difficulties will be met with between the high-level crossing of the St. John and the crossing of the river Tobique, as well as near the Degel  on Lake Temiscouta."

Of No. 5 route, Mr. Fleming remarks, "That with the exception of the portion between Eagle Lake and the sources of the Green River, this line has been instrumentally examined from end to end, and *without doubt is quite practicable*. The distance from River du Loup to Fredericton is 262 miles, to St. John 328, and to Halifax 594, with 437 miles to construct."

One of the chief arguments in favor of the Western routes Nos. 1, 2, and 3, is, that from the population of the North Eastern section of Maine, considerable traffic would be secured to the Intercolonial.

It has already been shown that No. 5 route would secure all the traffic of that section of country that either of these would. Were it otherwise, that, in itself, would be no reason for locating the Intercolonial by the frontier.

As it would be unwise to build it *away from the frontier* on military grounds, to the sacrifice of the commercial interests of the Dominion, it would be as unwise to build it *close to and parallel* with the frontier for forty miles, for the traffic of the Aroostook section of Maine, to the *permanent injury* of the Central and North Eastern sections of New Brunswick, and without one solitary compensating advantage to the other sections of the Dominion.

Two of the objects of the Intercolonial Railway are, to consolidate the Provinces, and open up new fields for settlement.

As No. 5 would not only better accomplish these than any of the other Western routes, and that without sacrificing any interest of the country, and at the same time should be unexceptionable to the British Government, its claims from a Colonial as well as Imperial point of view, are greater than No. 1, 2, or 3. If any of these is to be chosen, No. 3 is decidedly the best, as it is not only the shortest, but it passes through the city of Fredericton, the political and military capital of New Brunswick.

Referring to the different routes, the *Trade Review*, of Montreal, observes: "If No. 5 is found practicable, *it is the one of all others calculated to subserve the general good. It is far enough removed from the boundary to obviate any objections on that score. It brings into direct railway communication the cities of Halifax, St. John, Fredericton, Quebec, Montreal, and Ottawa, and in so doing places Saint John about 100 miles nearer Quebec than by either of the north shore routes, without materially increasing the distance to Halifax, and in one instance making it actually less. It is the one best calculated to serve evenly the interest of all four of the Provinces of the Dominion.*"

In Mr. Fleming's classification of routes, No. 5, although passing through Fredericton, and entering the city of Saint John from the west, is called a Central route; this, from one point of view, is strictly correct, as after leaving Fredericton it passes up the Keswick and enters the centre of the country and follows on to the St. Lawrence.

Mr. Fleming, in his report, says, "A line through the centre of New Brunswick would take the supplies for the lumbering trade, and would rapidly settle up the large tracts of cultivable land in this district. A railway, so situated, as a line of communication, would have similar effects on the trade and progress of New Brunswick as the river St. John has had, with this additional advantage, it would be open all the year instead of half of it.

"In much less time, it is believed, than has been occupied in settling and improving the lands which nature made accessible by the river, would the artificial means of communication result in populating the interior of the country

through the greater part of its length, and thus develop and foster a traffic which does not now exist."

No. 5 would secure to passengers to and from the West a resting place at the end of a day's journey at either *Fredericton* or *St. John*, in place of having to pass the night in the heart of the country. In the winter, often storm-staid for days; in summer, a dreary journey at best, even if there were no black flies or mosquitoes to torment the traveller.

The inevitable consequence of building the railway through the wilderness, *away from the centres of population*, will be to turn the stream of European and Western travel over the American roads. As the Apohaqui lines would pass for more than 300 miles through the wilderness, and away from *St. John* and *Fredericton*, the travel to and from these cities, as well as *Western Nova Scotia*, would pass over the American roads, and be lost to the Intercolonial.

The larger portion of the European and Western travel would follow the same course, as after a voyage across the Atlantic, a ride in the cars through a wilderness country, away from the centres of society, would not be undertaken if any other and more inviting route existed, like the *European and North American*.

Mr. Fleming, in his report, most justly remarks: "It would be manifestly *unwise to overlook this projected route*, for it is too apparent that the Intercolonial may find in the United States route a formidable rival for the Canadian passenger travel to and from Europe."

To build the Intercolonial by a Northern or Apohaqui route would be another "RIDEAU," upon which the British Government expended \$4,000,000, the income from which in 1863 was \$8,242, while for the same period the expenditure was \$23,251. And like it, "would draw heavily on the public treasury for repairs every year, dragging out a burdensome existence in *peace*, that perchance it might be useful in *war*." If history repeats itself, may it not be on a work of fivefold magnitude, and that, too, *entirely at the expense of the Dominion*. The travelling motto of the age is *celerity, certainty and comfort*.

Sir Francis Hincks's practical eye readily discovered that a Western route was the one the country required. 1st. Because it will be the shortest to the Ocean: 2nd. Because it would pass through the military and commercial cities of Fredericton and St. John: 3rd. Because it can be kept, if required, *as far distant from the American frontier as a portion of the line from River du Loup to Quebec*: and 4th. Because it was universally admitted to be the first as a commercial line.

The Hon. Thomas Bailie, when Surveyor General of New Brunswick, recommended the route which agrees with Mr. Fleming's No. 5.

The Nova Scotia Parliament, in 1852, passed an Act for the construction of the Intercolonial Railway by a *Western route*. Immediately after, the Hon. John A. Street, Attorney General, and one of the members for the County of *Northumberland*, moved the following resolution in the House of Assembly of New Brunswick: "Whenever the funds necessary shall be raised by loan or guarantee under the authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or advanced as a loan to the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, it shall be lawful for the Lieutenant Governor in Council to enter into arrangements with the Government of the United Kingdom and with the Governments of Canada and Nova Scotia for the construction of a Railway from Halifax to some point opposite the city of Quebec, thence down the St. Lawrence to River du Loup or Trois Pistoles, and thence traversing in its main course, on British territory watered by the tributaries of the river St. John to the city of St. John, and thence on or near the proposed route of the E. & N. A. Railway to the Northern boundary of Nova Scotia, and on to Halifax." This resolution was carried by a vote of 27 to 10; and on a motion to reconsider, it was again sustained by a vote of 30 to 7. The motion to reconsider was *even opposed* by most of the Northern members.

The Hon. Member from Northumberland, in supporting the resolution, took a broad and statesmanlike view of the question. He said, "As soon as the *Great Railway* should be opened, there would be no doubt that every section of

New Brunswick would soon be connected with it, and the whole Province would be intersected by railways. That was the case in every country where railways had been introduced, and there was no reason why the same results should not follow from this great railway in New Brunswick."

Of the different Western routes, No. 5 will better facilitate the construction of branch lines, and open up a finer country for settlement, than any of the others, as it keeps more to the centre of the Province. It would be a great artery, with its branches running out to the river St. John on the one side, and to the Restigouche and Miramichi on the other.

Whether looked at from an Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, or Nova Scotia point of view, No. 5 would appear to be the best calculated "to serve evenly the interests of ALL FOUR OF THE PROVINCES OF THE DOMINION."

COST OF THE INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY.

Eminence in Engineering consists not alone in the superiority of a work, or in the extent of the difficulties overcome, cost should enter largely into the question of qualification.

The "Chat moss bog" stamped the reputation of the elder Stephenson, placing him at the head of his profession, not so much for the work accomplished, as for the low price at which it was done. The cost of the work was £28,000 Stg. The estimate of Mr. Giles, an educated Engineer, was £270,000.

The railway from the city of St. John to Shediac, 108 miles in length, was constructed by the Government of New Brunswick, at a cost per mile of nearly \$44,000: it is a good road, but from the experience gained, its equal could be built for all of \$7,000 less per mile. Messrs. Peto, Brassey & Co. entered into a contract with a Company—in which the Government had shares, to build and equip it for \$32,500 per mile, receiving their pay chiefly in the bonds of the road, and taking themselves a large portion of the stock. Had they gone on with the work, it would not have equalled in character the present line; at the same time, it should be added, the failure to proceed did not arise from any objection to the price.

The Engineer, in his estimate of the cost of the road now under construction from the city of St. John to the American border, (a section of the E. & N. A. Railway,) says, "Using the experience we have *already gained*, we should build and equip the road, as good for all practical purposes as our *present one*, for \$30,000 per mile; but to meet *all possible* contingencies, add \$2,000 per mile."

Mr. Buck, in his "Review of the Intercolonial Railway surveys," estimates the cost for a section of the Intercolonial by routes Nos. 1 and 2—including the bridge across the St. John below the Tobique, 100 feet high and 800 feet long, costing \$220,000—equipped with the same proportion of rolling stock as Mr. Fleming has estimated for, at \$33,400 per mile.

No. 3, for nearly its whole length, follows the same course as No. 1, the exceptional section not only shortens the road 17 miles, but also carries it through Fredericton.

Of Nos. 1 and 3, it has already been stated that Mr. Buck reported, "that, on *instrumental examination*, a line by the west of Temiscouta Lake was found *entirely impracticable*," unless by the Valley of the St. Francis river, or to the East by the river Trois Pistoles and Lake Temiscouta; in either case, the line will be considerably lengthened. A detour to the East would add to the length, by these routes, 19 miles.

The mileage to construct, or buy out, by the Western routes, from River du Loup to Halifax, would be as follows:

By route No. 1, 447 miles.

" " 2, 459 "

" " 3, 430 "

" " 4, 435 "

" " 5, 437 "

Applying Mr. Buck's estimate of \$33,400 per mile to No. 3, the cost of the Intercolonial would be \$14,362,000, and by No. 5 route \$14,595,800.

The railway by either of these two routes would pass through Fredericton, consequently the bridge across the St. John below the Tobique, estimated by Mr. Buck as costing \$220,000, would not be required at that place, but at some point between the Keswick and Fredericton.

The bridging of the St. John does not present the *insurmountable* difficulties which many suppose.

From the many islands in the St. John between these two places, the facilities for bridging the river are great. A bridge could be built across Sugar Island, immediately below the mouth of the Keswick, where only two piers would be required in the river, and one of them on the "Burpee sand bar," which for most of the year is out of water.

Another location for a bridge is across "Never's Island," $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles above Fredericton. The whole span across is only 40 chains, of which the Island and sand bar covers more than one half. The channels on both sides are shallow, and would not require more than one pier in each. There are other points at which the river could be bridged, but these appear the most desirable.

A bridge will also be required at the mouth of the river St. John. Several years ago, John Wilkinson, Esq., C. E., examined this spot, and describes it as follows: "The roadway will have a clear elevation of 80 feet above the level of high water. In order to obtain a clear foundation for the piers on the top and within the limits of the solid rock, the shortest advisable span from face to face would be 580 feet. The span can be materially diminished by building up the piers from the bed of the river, against the face of the rock on each side, making such excavations in the latter as would be necessary to compactly unite the solid material with the masonry. By this plan, it is probable the span might be reduced nearly 100 feet. The bridge is assumed to be one of suspension. The shortest distance from the base of 'Split Rock' to the base of the rock opposite, is 253 feet; but the character of the approaches on either side in the direction of this distance, renders it unavailable for the purpose of a railway."

As a Tubular bridge would be the best, it is possible the approaches could be improved, and made available, and thus materially reduce the span. It must be remembered that this bridge would be required for the railway by any of the Western routes.

A Siding from the line, just before reaching the bridge, would connect with Carleton with its extensive wharf accommodation, on the Western side of the harbor of St. John, where every facility exists for the erection of warehouses, &c., and where vessels could not only receive from the cars the products of the West, but also the cars receive from vessels the products of tropical and other climes.

If \$33,400 per mile is sufficient to build the Intercolonial by routes No. 1, 2, or 3, there is no reason why No. 5 should not be constructed for something like the same sum. Much of this last route is common to all the Western lines: it is 10 miles shorter than No. 1, and 22 miles shorter than No. 2 routes.

If \$33,400 per mile is sufficient to build the Intercolonial, its cost will not exceed \$15,000,000. If, "to meet all possible contingencies," we add \$5,000 per mile, its cost will be under \$17,000,000.

Mr. Fleming's estimate for his surveyed Central route is \$45,500 per mile. In his report, he says, "*his quantities and prices are liberal and sufficient*, and that he has embraced in his estimate an allowance for contingencies, as well as provision for a telegraph, workmen's dwellings, and a reserve fund for increasing the rolling stock and station accommodations."

There is reason to believe, however, that on a more thorough examination of the country, he will be able to construct a railway, suitable for an Intercolonial, with a much less expenditure. A road equal to the one from St. John to Shediac should be all that is required. With a cash capital, its equal should be built and equipped for \$38,400 per mile.

SHALL THE GOVERNMENT, OR A COMPANY, OWN THE INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY?

In a work of a semi-national character, designed for a commercial and military highway, there are strong reasons why it should be the property of the Government.

To vest a Company with the proprietorship of a work of that character, would be to clothe them with great power. They would be an irresponsible body, beyond the reach of public opinion.

The New York Constitutional Convention passed a resolution—which is to be submitted to the people, and which, if adopted, will form a section of the Constitution—prohibiting the consolidation of railway companies, with a combined capital of \$20,000,000. The object is to check the accumulation of capital in the hands of Corporations, which might abuse their power and privilege, to the detriment of Legislative independence and the interest of the State.

In the debate in the New Brunswick Legislature in 1852, on the Intercolonial railway resolutions, the Hon. John H. Gray said, "In considering whether the Government should undertake this work, he would start with laying down a proposition which he deemed incontrovertible, viz., that when the geographical features of a country were such, that the great Trunk lines of road passing through it would admit of no competition, then in such cases they should be Government works. Otherwise, if given to a private Company, they would become monopolies forever."

In Belgium the chief lines of railways were constructed by the Government. Smiles, in his *Life of George Stephenson*, says, "In 1844 the entire national system was completed and opened, after a total outlay on works, stations, and plant, of nearly £7,000,000 Stg. Never did any Legislature expend public money in a wiser manner for the promotion of the common good. The Belgian lines were executed by the State, and the whole capital was remunerative; and the Belgian people thus obtained the full advantage of railways at *less* than one half the average cost of those in England." The branch lines in that country were constructed by Companies.

As the existing sections of the Intercolonial Railway in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia belong to the Government, the links essential to its completion should also be their property, and for the right management of which they will be responsible to Parliament and the Country.

SHOULD IT BE LET IN SECTIONS?

If let in sections it will cost less than if let to a Company to build, as in the former case the competition will be greater

and consequently the price lower. If let to a Company, and it was found not to be as profitable as was expected, much trouble, as well as delay, might arise. A Company that could undertake such a work would be a powerful body, and might demand from the Government an increased price per mile, as a condition of *proceeding*, or a large allowance for the work performed, as a condition of *surrendering* the contract. No guarantee could be given that the work would be executed in accordance with the conditions of contract.

Delay itself would be a serious matter, and as the longer the time taken for the completion of the work, the more profitable it might be for the contractors, hence one reason to fear its occurrence. As the *interest* would be going on upon the sum expended, delay would be a loss to the public; but a much greater loss would arise from deferring the time when the new highway from the St. Lawrence to the Ocean would be thrown open to trade, commerce, and settlement.

On the 29th of SEPTEMBER, 1852, a contract was made on the part of a Company—in which the Government of New Brunswick had an interest—with Messrs. Peto, Brassey & Co., for the construction of a first class railway from the city of St. John to Shediac, 108 miles in length, to be finished by the first day of JULY, 1857. For reasons which it is not essential to name, the contract was cancelled in the month of APRIL, 1856, on the payment, for the work performed, of *ninety thousand pounds Sterling*. The Government had to buy out the Company and Contractors, and finish the line. It was let in short sections.

The most economic as well as the most expeditious way to build the Intercolonial, would be to let it out in sections of not over fifty miles, as numerous contractors could be found willing to construct portions of the line, who would be unable to contract for the whole. Section letting would largely increase the number of competitors, not only thereby economising the cost of the line, but expediting the work. Should any of the Contractors fail to come up to the conditions of contract, others would be ready to take their places, and no delay would arise.

Station houses, and erections of like character, should form the subject of distinct contracts.

The rolling stock, which Mr. Fleming estimates will cost \$1,250,000, should be largely divided, securing thereby not only lower prices, but better work; as well as tending to distribute its construction among different sections of the Dominion.

Everything points to the policy of subdivision, on the ground of *economy, security, and expedition.*

THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC RAILWAY.

The Intercolonial will form the Atlantic link of the Railway which is to unite the Eastern and Western sections of the continent, and which is indispensable to the consolidation of the British dependencies in America; and also be a short highway, through British territory, to the East India possessions, and to China and Japan.

One of the marvels of the age is the rapid progress of the American line, fast joining together the Atlantic and Pacific States. Commenced in the midst of a war of unparalleled magnitude and expenditure, it is going forward to completion with all the expedition that could be desired. Notwithstanding the great length of road to construct, and physical obstacles to overcome, the line will be open for traffic within three years, when a journey can be made from New York to California in less than eight days, and to Japan in less than twenty.

The trade of the East in its Teas and Silks, will for the most part pass over this line, as there will be a saving by it over the sea voyage of from 80 to 100 days. British commerce with the East will greatly suffer from the diversion that will follow the opening of the United States Pacific Railway.

The people who have expended on the little Isle of Britain over Five Hundred Million pounds Sterling in the construction of railways, and over \$500,000,000 in a war to secure the independence of Turkey, will not suffer the commerce of China and Japan to fall into the hands of a foreign power, when by the expenditure of a little over \$100,000,000 on a

reproductive work, they would have, through their own territory, a highway to their Eastern possessions, as well as to other Oriental countries.

The military importance of a Pacific railway to the British nation, cannot be over-estimated.

A line of railway through British territory would not only bring closer the East India possessions, but is indispensable to the consolidation and opening up the great virgin country between the Lakes and the Pacific Ocean. From the great natural advantages of the country through which it will pass, the facilities for its construction, maintenance and running, will be much superior to the American line; consequently, it will be the popular route.

The construction of the Intercolonial railway will give an impetus to this NATIONAL work, as by the time it is finished, the Pacific line now building, will be in operation, and its paying properties indisputably established.

It is to be hoped before that period the British Government will anticipate *the position*, and have a survey made for the prolongation of the Intercolonial to the shores of the Pacific.

This is the great work of the future. It is demanded for the consolidation of power, the expansion of trade, and the retention of commercial supremacy. Its completion will mark an era in British history.

If it is right to spend treasure in behalf of the oppressed, or in vindicating the honor of the country, it is equally right to spend it on the construction of a work, that will extend the commerce and prestige of the nation.

The London *Times* says, "Progress, and always Progress, and evermore Progress, appears to be the destiny of our land."

J. W. LAWRENCE.

APPENDIX.

(From the *Montreal Trade Review*, August 30.)

THE INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY.

Mr. Lawrence advocates the construction of the line by either route No. 3 or No. 5. Let us see what it means. The first is a frontier route. From Riviere du Loup it pursues a course parallel to the Temiscouta Road down the Madawaska River to the village of Edmonston or Little Falls, thence along the Eastern bank of the River to Grand Falls; it then leaves the river, and strikes across the country, crossing the rivers Tobique and Munquart, the Forks of the Miramichi, and down the Keswick Valley to Fredericton. At Fredericton it crosses the River St. John, and proceeds, by the line recently surveyed by order of the New Brunswick Government, to St. John, where it joins the existing railway to Moncton and Shediac. The distance to Halifax by this route is 567 miles, and to St. John 301 miles. The great objection made to this route, and one which will in all probability cause its ultimate rejection, is the fact of its passing for the whole distance from Little Falls to Grand Falls (exceeding thirty miles) close to the boundary, the River St. John only intervening. Route No. 5, the other suggested by Mr. Lawrence, is the second of the central routes surveyed by Mr. Fleming. Leaving Riviere du Loup it keeps a course further to the northward than the former line, by Eagle Lake, and the Forks of the Toledo; crossing the Forks of the Miramichi it proceeds down the Keswick Valley to Fredericton, where it crosses the River St. John, and onward by the Oromocto and Douglas Valley to St. John. The distance to St. John by this route will be 328 miles, and to Halifax 594 miles. It must be observed that in both these cases the existing railway from St. John to Shediac will be available as far as Moncton—90 miles—at or near which place the connection with the Nova Scotian Railway system must necessarily be made, and that the distance to Halifax by either route is less than by one of the Bay Chaleur or North Shore routes, and very little in excess of the two others.

We think that if, upon a more accurate survey of this No. 5 Central

route, it should be found practicable, it is the one of all others calculated to subserve the general good. It is far enough removed from the boundary to obviate any objections on that score. It brings into direct railway communication the cities of Halifax, St. John, Fredericton, Quebec, Montreal and Ottawa, and in so doing, places St. John about 100 miles nearer Quebec and Montreal than by either of the North Shore routes, without materially increasing the distance to Halifax, and, as we have seen in one instance, making it actually less. It is not necessary to dwell upon the great importance to Ontario and Quebec of having easy access to St. John. Its advantages as a shipping port are well set forth in Mr. Lawrence's letter, and have been lately advocated in the *Trade Review*, but we may observe, that No. 5 line, taking Moncton as a starting point, passes for a distance of more than 180 miles through a settled country, and whatever commercial advantages may be derived from that, will certainly follow its adoption. We cannot help thinking, however, that a little too much stress has been laid upon this point in some quarters, and that a Railway, even though it should pass through unsettled districts, will generally be found to develop resources previously lying idle, and very often far more valuable than anticipated. There is good reason for believing that this will be found to be the case with the unsettled portion of this Central line.

We shall watch the progress of this question with great interest, being fully convinced that a route near the one we have been speaking of, is best calculated to serve evenly the interests of all four of the Provinces of the Dominion; of Ontario and Quebec more especially, by giving them the readiest means of access to two Atlantic ports instead of one.

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